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5.3  The Closure of the Printing House 
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<Image 7.01>  The closure of the Printing House in 1989 was a momentous decision in the 
history of OUP, and marked the end of an era. After all, when the Press had recently 
celebrated its five hundredth anniversary, in 1978, it was actually the first printing in Oxford 
which was being celebrated. The Walton Street site was substantially given over to printing, 
although since the move of most operations from London in the mid-1970s, the publishing 
divisions had taken over an increasing amount of space. Being published by the Press had 
for a long time meant being printed there as well and the reputation of the composition and 
printing was high. A conversation in Dorothy Sayers’s novel Gaudy Night (1935) has Harriet 
Walter remarking, as an accepted fact, that the Press was ‘accustomed to deciphering the 
manuscripts of scholars’. Authors, printers and publishers had all seemed bound together. 
The closure of the printing operations was devastating news to many loyal employees, some 
of whom could trace a history of working at the Press over several generations. 
 
Cyril Cox was the third generation of his family to work at the Press. His grandfather has 
been a hand compositor and his uncle worked in the bindery. He joined the Printing Division 
as an apprentice at sixteen, and remembers how ‘some of the old craftsmen were the nicest 
people – rough at times – but the nicest people you could ever wish to know’.  The highlight 
of working in the Division was ‘the spirit, the humour and the comradeship’ amongst the 
workforce.1
 
This was reflected in the communities, in Jericho and Jordan Hill, who not only 
worked together but played together: for example, team games of cricket, football, tennis, 
and putting at the Jordan Hill sports ground, with an annual winter Olympics in the Pavilion. 
Most of these activities came to an abrupt end with the closure of the Printing Division. 
 
In 1970 few could have foreseen the end of the printing business, which at that time 
employed over 900 people, three times as many as the publishing operations. Working as a 
printer was seen by many as a secure job for life. On leaving school, a boy could become 
apprenticed at the works, and there was a coming-out ceremony called ‘banging out’, at 
which boys would have to run the gauntlet of their department. A variety of objects were 
used to make a terrific din as apprentices made their way to collect their indentures. 
Training compositors could lead to their becoming highly skilled in setting languages in 
which they had no formal education. Graduates were employed as readers, where they 
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joined a department full of academic talent. Women were employed throughout the 
workforce, from the bindery line to the Reading Department. As well as carrying out work 
for the publishing divisions, the Printer did work for external customers. The inflated wages 
earned by newspaper staff in Fleet Street led the outside world to believe that every printer 
was rolling in money.2 
 
Being the head of the Division was a prestigious role, formally described as the Printer to 
the University. The incumbent, Vivian Ridler, had left school to be apprenticed to a Bristol 
printer and joined OUP first in 1936, and again in 1948 as Works Manager. He had designed 
the Bible used at the Queen’s coronation in 1953, and was a president of the British 
Federation of Master Printers and a Professorial Fellow of St Edmund Hall. Printing in Oxford 
was important within both the University and a much wider world.  <Image 7.02> 
  
The decline in the printing operations can be charted over a number of years, and even in 
Ridler’s time (he retired in 1978) the stresses were apparent. When it was suggested to him 
that after dealing with the day’s business, he could then relax and spend the rest of the day 
designing books, he responded with some irritation: ‘no, I’ll tell you. Half my time is spent 
arguing with unions and the other half negotiating the purchase of machinery with banks.'3  
Various reasons lie behind the failure of the printing operations, including a growth in 
international competition, a lack of competitiveness in the market, technological change, 
failures in management, and the often fraught relationship with the publishing operations. 
In the end the worsening financial deficit of the Printing House could no longer be ignored. 
 
Why have a printing operation? This question was to exercise the Press over many decades, 
and at its heart was the strategic issue about whether a publisher need have its own printer. 
In the 21st century this is highly unusual, and in 2004 that of the only major publisher, 
Cambridge University Press, still in this position, looked increasingly questionable.4 In the 
areas of typesetting and printing, publishers are happy to use a range of suppliers. The 
Waldock Report of 1970 explicitly asked, ‘should the Press continue to have as part of its 
organization a printing works?’ It did go on to support the modernization of the Printing 
Division, and the strategic question was perhaps answered by the level of profit attributed 
to the printing operation – on sales which represented 12 per cent of the turnover of the 
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Press, the Printing Works were responsible for 17 per cent of the pre-tax profit. The Printer 
made money, and retained within the overall group the profits to be made on printing up to 
50 per cent of the books published by the Press. Indeed someone who joined OUP in 1971 
recalled that it was the Printer who made the money, and the Publisher who lost it.5 As the 
Table…demonstrates, however, that was scarcely accurate then and, as time passed, 
certainly ceased to be the case. 
  
By 1975 there were rising concerns within the publishing operations over the prices being 
paid to the in-house printing operation. A tied operation meant that the Printer’s profits 
could be generated through the prices charged, rather than through high levels of 
productivity. Although there were no doubts regarding the quality of work produced, there 
was the complaint from Eric Buckley, then Head of Publishing Services and based in 
Neasden, that ‘in many cases the difference between the figures quoted by the Printing 
Works and those quoted for the same operations by other printers is quite substantial. It is 
unlikely that this is always due to these printers’ and binders’ desperation for work.’6 By 
1979, when Buckley had moved over from the publishing operations to become the Printer, 
the Printing Division was now seen to be working on the terms of an arm’s length 
relationship. He told managers within the Division that, as a profit centre, it was expected to 
produce work at competitive prices and give a satisfactory standard of service.7 
 
The financial difficulties faced by the Press in the late 1970s and early 1980s were to raise 
further questions about the relationship between the publishing operations and printing. 
The Publishing Divisions needed to cuts costs and this required seeking out the best prices 
for typesetting and printing, wherever that might be in the world. By June 1981 the 
Educational Division was requesting full discretion to place work outside the Press, and for 
the directive to be lifted which required all work to be given to the Printing Division.8 
 
In truth, what was wanted by the divisions outside the Academic Division was ceasing to 
match what the Printing Division provided. <Image 7.03>  More colour work was being 
created but the Division was set up for monochrome printing. It could handle the books 
coming from the Academic Division, whether dictionaries or monographs, but here the 
search was on for lower costs and higher levels of service, both for typesetting and printing. 
Robin Denniston, the Academic Publisher, said that the most significant savings were made 
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in composition ‘which at £20 to £30 per page was often more than 50 per cent of the 
production costs of a scholarly monograph. There were those on the Finance Committee 
who thought we should continue to keep the Press’s own compositors busy, whatever the 
cost. But costs were dramatically cut by using lady graduates with IBM typewriters who 
could set (and often correct) scholarly matter for £4 per page; and compositors in India and 
elsewhere in the East whose wages were one-tenth of their British counterparts.’9 In the 
1980s the Academic Division also moved away from employing in-house copy-editors 
towards using freelance copy-editors and proof readers. This was a more flexible and cost-
effective approach, now standard in publishing. By 1982 the share of work carried out by 
the Printer from the publishing divisions had fallen to 35 per cent. There had been a steady 
decline in the staffing of the Printing Division and in only the two previous years the 
workforce had declined by over 170 people, down to a payroll of 470. Handling the 
relationship between the divisions was a fraught business, with direct memos flying 
between managers on both sides of what was becoming a big divide. Representatives from 
the publishing divisions sat on a Printing Review Board, looking at the operations of the 
Printing Division, yet the printers complained that they had no representation within the 
publishing divisions.   
  
It was in these circumstances that one of the graduate readers in the Printing Division, 
James Fettes, wrote to the Vice-Chancellor, Sir Geoffrey Warnock in 1982 airing is concerns 
for the future. He could foresee that printing might be abandoned altogether. He 
questioned a strategy of trying to be ‘like any other printing house’ and thought sending 
more work to external printers was damaging to the reputation of the Press: ‘most of the 
public and some reviewers are not alert enough to distinguish between the publishing and 
the printing activities of the Press, and so the Printer gets blamed for the work of other 
firms.’ The letter was a cri de coeur  at a time when the Press was trying to get a grip on its 
costs in all its operations.10 Warnock replied that ‘the outlook is not altogether bleak, nor is 
closure contemplated, but there is undoubtedly very great pressure to reduce costs and 
take  other steps to ensure that the Printing Division can at least support its operations.’11  
Buckley commented that Fettes’s letter ‘made me think of Chekhov – there are those who 
hear the axes at work in the cherry orchard less clearly than others.’12 There may be no 
connection with this correspondence but Fettes was asked to take early retirement soon 
after; and of course Buckley himself left in 1983. 
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Gerard Frost, Finance Director, urged greater coordination, citing the example of a web 
offset machine, which was ordered in 1978 and built specially by Timsons of Kettering. The 
machine, costing £0.25m, was delivered in 1980 and the intention was for it primarily to 
handle the printing of mini-dictionaries. However, the format of the dictionaries changed, 
resulting in the machine standing idle.13 This example typified the difficulties of running a 
tied printing operation: publishers had to be flexible and imaginative over formats, not 
simply produce to the specifications of a certain machine. The needs of the market were 
more important than feeding work to particular machines. It was also highly unusual in the 
industry to have machinery specially built, and most printers would opt to buy standard 
machines. As the Publishing divisions regained profitability in the 1980s, their view was that 
the Printer had to be encouraged to cut costs and raise productivity and levels of service. 
Gone was the idea that he should automatically be offered the books from in-house 
operations. Only when properly exposed to the market would the division become 
profitable and competitive and it found itself competing for work with many companies 
keen to have OUP amongst their customers. 
  
What was also required was industrial expertise to run the Printing Division, and head-
hunters were organized to find a successor to Buckley. <Image 7.04>  David Stanford was 
brought in from William Clowes, part of the McCorquodale group, with the brief to develop 
a new strategy for the Division’s future. (Exactly one hundred years earlier, Horace Hart had 
also arrived from William Clowes to become Printer.) He took on a highly difficult job since 
earlier that year a firm of consultants pronounced the performance of the printing 
operations to be below that of all other competitors it had examined. Productivity, as 
measured by added value per employee and by the use of plant and equipment, was lower 
than that of any other company in their sample. They commented that the task ahead of the 
new Printer was truly enormous, as without the work secured in printing exam papers, the 
plight of the business was ‘parlous’.14 Which direction should the Division take over the next 
few years? The economist John Wright of Trinity College reflected to George Richardson on 
the task ahead. Should there be investment in colour presses or some other technology? ‘If 
we are not willing to contemplate that sort of development...should we not acknowledge (at 
least to ourselves) that what we are looking for is a “fighting retreat” to a port of 
evacuation.’15  A few months earlier, The Clarendonian reprinted a cartoon from a previous 
edition in 1945 in which some visitors were being shown round the quad. A sole compositor 
was at work on trays of type by the fish pond, underneath the tree, whilst the guests were 
told: ‘it’s all offices now’.  The 1983 caption read: ‘one of our readers noticed the cartoon 
we reprint below. If the artist recognizes his work the Editors would be grateful if he would 
come forward and start filling in our football coupons’. In March 1983 the financial position 
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of the Printing Division was such that some consideration had already been given to disposal 
of the operations. (The Printing Division was to post a loss of over £0.5m in 1983). Points in 
favour of a sale were the wishes of the publishing divisions to operate a purely arm’s length 
relationship; the different management skills required to run publishing and printing 
operations (senior management did not feel equipped to run a printing business); and the 
likely costs of further contraction in the business. Put against were a variety of points, most 
notable being that they would be unlikely to find a buyer. Richardson wrote to the Group 
Executive Committee: ‘I am inclined to think the last point decisive. If we cannot sell the 
business we have no option but to try very hard to make the best of it.’16 
 
A backdrop to the worsening business position of the Printing Division was the change in 
typesetting and printing technology. Once the industry moved from hot metal setting to 
filmsetting, publishers were increasingly free to place typesetting and printing at different 
suppliers. The final output, or camera-ready copy (CRC), would arrive at the publisher from 
the typesetter and then be sent on to the printer for the film to be prepared. On reprint the 
CRC could if desired be sent to a different supplier. Typesetting was bought on a price per 
page and as computing power became cheaper and more available, authors would begin to 
write on word processors and typesetting could move to smaller businesses with lower 
overheads. The 1983 edition of Hart’s Rules (the bible of OUP house style) made no 
concession to computerized typesetting but, only the following year, the Academic Division 
was experimenting with using disks from authors and issuing guidance in the form of Oxford 
Rules for the Preparation of Text on Microcomputers.17 
 
Desktop publishing opened up the prospect of a cottage industry in people’s front rooms. 
PageMaker software, for example, allowed word-processing files to be read on an Apple 
Mac computer without the need for authors to enter special codes. James Mosley sees 24 
January 1984, the launch of the Apple Macintosh, as ‘the beginning of the digital revolution 
in printing and publishing. ...the design and assembly of a publication’s parts – originally the 
printer’s responsibility and, during the 20th century, increasingly shared with a design or 
production department in a publisher’s office – could now be performed by one person with 
a small computer on their desk.’18 Speed of communications also brought foreign 
competition, and Macmillan had opened up a computer-aided typesetting operation in India 
in the mid-1970s. If the publishing divisions were seeking lower costs for book production, 
the answer was to go overseas for typesetting, in particular to Hong Kong. This would also 
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apply to other publishers in the UK – they might come to the Printing Division for highly 
specialized work, but for most general work the prices would be cheaper elsewhere. The 
paperback revolution had not reached the Printing Division and most printing jobs were for 
cased work or for hardbacks. The printer had web machines suitable for longer runs, which 
could handle dictionaries and bible work. This did fit the needs of the Academic Division but 
they were in turn seeking lower prices overseas; and the Printer could only produce sewn 
books. Dictionaries, for example, could be printed in the USA at advantageous rates and on 
larger machines that could produce unsewn books which lay flat on opening.19 For the other 
divisions, increasingly wanting low-cost colour work, Hong Kong again provided a significant 
financial advantage. 
  
The deep recession of the early 1980s brought difficulties for all sectors of the economy but 
in particular for manufacturing. With monetary policy directed at controlling inflation, the 
economy suffered heavily under high interest rates and a high exchange rate. There was 
falling domestic demand and no salvation for manufacturing in the exchange rate, with the 
pound reaching high levels. Manufacturing output fell by one-fifth between 1979 and 1981. 
Whilst the rest of the economy recovered from 1982, manufacturing continued to decline. 
Overall the economy performed well with Britain’s productivity seeing spectacular gains in 
the 1980s, third only behind Japan and France, but critics attributed this to the growth in 
the service and finance sectors alongside the virtual disappearance of manufacturing as a 
major part of the economy.20 
  
In the Printing Division the worsening economy turned a surplus of over £0.5 m in 1980 into 
losses in both 1981 and 1982. In January 1981 The Guardian reported the Printing Division 
to be working at half its capacity with the bindery, capable of handling 100,000 books a 
week, on short time.21 The same day The Times reported that over 200 jobs were going at 
the printing machinery plant of Linotype & Machinery in Manchester. The managing 
director, Peter Cope, blamed the recession and a fall in exports caused by the high value of 
the pound.22 It is estimated that in the early 1980s one-third of British printing went 
overseas.23 Surveying the scene in June 1982, Buckley saw greatly changed conditions 
compared to the late 1970s: ‘Dependence upon physical skill has diminished and far fewer 
people are needed to carry out the kind of typesetting and bindery work that customers 
want. Competition from cheaper sources of production is considerably more serious, and 
recessionary pressures have reduced demand. British print-buyers place more work abroad 
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than those in any other major country, and UK book printers have suffered in circumstances 
that have forced publishers to cut production costs dramatically.’24 If the UK print industry 
was to survive, the challenge was to raise levels of productivity and meet the challenges of 
foreign competition.  <Image 7.05> 
  
Economically the survival of much manufacturing in the UK looked dubious but the balance 
of power between the unions and management looked set to change. The print industry had 
a complicated union structure and at OUP there were dealings with both SOGAT and the 
National Graphical Association (NGA). Rising unemployment and a government determined 
to take on the power of the trade unions were to weaken organized labour during the 
course of the Thatcher government. At OUP there were agreements in place with the print 
unions which were regarded as restrictive by the management regarding, for example, the 
necessity to rekey work in composition and a refusal to accept work from non-unionized 
businesses. Wage settlements were negotiated nationally for the printing industry. How 
long could such agreements hold with the growth of new technology and international 
competition? John  Wright had written to Richardson in 1979: ‘when I start work on my new 
book later this year I may well type it onto the new computer that the College has acquired 
(cost £5,000 +) for its accounting. It is not a specialist word-processor but it has an editing 
program (which cost us £30) which permits insertions, displays, and rearrangements on a 
television screen and the text can be stored on discs each of which will hold one million 
characters. ...soon only the unions will prevent the disc produced by the author (or his 
secretary) being automatically processed by the printing industry. ... How long can the 
unions prevent this happening? We can see that they can obstruct in the newspaper 
industry.’25 Shown this letter, Buckley responded that it was unlikely that union members 
would handle input from an author’s tape or disc, although there were probably some 
printers who would, and over time union attitudes might be forced to change.26 Writing in 
June 1982, he discussed using direct reproduction for some University work, i.e. simply 
photographing exam papers as prepared by the faculties. This was likely to reduce 
production costs by a fifth. ‘Because there is an NGA national ban on handling work not set 
by NGA members, a case was put up to union headquarters giving cogent reasons why this 
ban should not be applied. This met with a flat refusal. A further approach, with support 
from our own chapel members, resulted in special dispensation being given in respect of 
work from this University. This change of attitude came as a relief.’27 
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On the publishing side of the business, ingenious solutions had already been found to 
circumvent union control. Barry Townsend, Production Director of the Academic division, 
recalls how in the 1970s ‘the NGA started to twig that people were sending stuff abroad and 
they didn’t want their members in the printing business to handle printing from non-
recognized  sources abroad.’ Camera Ready Copy (CRC) was required to be stamped by an 
NGA recognized supplier before it could be handled by the domestic printers. To source 
typesetting work from India, the completed jobs would be stamped by a friendly local 
supplier in the UK, which had joined the NGA.28 In the following decade, as across the 
industry much printing work was moved abroad, the NGA would find itself bypassed 
completely. 
  
Union power in the UK was also weakened in the 1980s by the rise in unemployment 
together with  the reforms brought in by the Conservative government. Union membership 
fell in the 1980s, dropping by over 2 million between 1979 and 1985. With the Employment 
Act of 1980, the government acted to limit union powers with a number of measures 
including limits on the closed shop and the removal of the burden of proof from the 
employer in unfair dismissal cases. Further legislation followed at the end of the 1980s but 
the stage was set for conflict between the government and the unions, typified by the 
miners’ strike of 1984 to 1985. In the print industry there was to be a climactic battle 
between management and the unions around new working practices for newspapers. Unlike 
in the book industry there could not be a switch to overseas suppliers, and the power of the 
unions was legendary. The advent of computerization offered a way to cut costs, and move 
away from hot metal setting. News International, the owner of The Sun, The News of the 
World, The Times and The Sunday Times, built a new printing plant in Wapping at a cost of 
£80m. The original plan was to move printing of The Sun and The News of the World there, 
but a new idea emerged: moving not just the printing of all four newspapers, but also to 
take the journalists there and start up computer typesetting. Journalists would key in copy 
directly – existing agreements with the unions insisted that all copy should be rekeyed. The 
new plant was put into operation in January 1986 and all employees who opposed the new 
plant and working practices through strike action were promptly dismissed. The key to the 
victory of Rupert Murdoch’s News International group lay in careful planning. A separate 
union agreement was secured with the (Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and 
Plumbers Union (EEPTU), excluding both SOGAT and the NGA, and the extent and capability 
of the computer system was kept hidden.29 The Wapping dispute lasted over a year and 
involved the sacking of 6,000 newspaper employees. Once it had ended, the News 
International papers had secured much higher levels of productivity and ended the 
dominance of the print unions. There was also a clear-out of staff within the production 
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management: Rupert Murdoch commented, ‘they could not get it into their heads that 
there was no departmental chapel to talk to. They were used to having a long lunch with the 
FOC [Father of the Chapel] to negotiate something.’30 By the end of the 1980s most 
newspapers had moved out of Fleet Street and embraced new working practices. 
  
At OUP in 1986 there were still disputes over the sourcing of text for composition, with a 
union requirement that disks read automatically should come from a unionized company – 
they had to bear an NGA sticker or stamp.31 In response there was some fighting talk. In 
discussions around the composition business and its future, George Richardson wrote of the 
need to change the way it was organized: ‘Other people can make money in composition, so 
we also should be able to do so. ... It is likely also to require that the NGA accept the new 
system of payment and that they do not press for more holidays as a condition for taking 
work from non-union sources. If by their unwillingness to meet these conditions we are 
prevented from making composition viable, then we shall reluctantly have to close it down. 
The NGA and our own workforce will have to be told that failure to co-operate will have this 
result, redundancy arrangements being on terms appropriate to this situation. It may be 
that industrial action would be taken in other parts of the Printing House. It should then be 
made known that complete closure would be considered.’32  <Image 7.06> 
  
Joining as the Printer in 1983, David Stanford tried to bring about consistent and profitable 
change in the Division. The view of Michael Morrow, head of the Education Division, was 
that it needed £8m of profitable sales to survive.33 This it struggled to do, as can be seen 
from the table below.34 
Table 5.2  Comparative performance of the UK publishing and printing operations 
 1970 1975 1980 1988 
Sales (£m)     
UK Publishing 6.5 9.9 22.3 56.1 
Printing 1.9 3.1 6.1 7.2 
     
Profit (£m)     
UK Publishing 0.4 (0.3) (1.5) 6.2 
Printing 0.2 0.3 0.5 (0.5) 
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Employees     
UK Publishing 250 306 610 600 
Printing 930 775 640 265 
 
Early in 1986 an estimate was prepared as to the costs of closure, and the overall figure was 
around £3m.35 In April Richardson commented: ‘perhaps slow death is what one must 
rationally expect, and it would not ruin us.’36 Sales did reach £8.5m in 1987 but fell back in 
the following year, whilst the profit of that year can mostly be attributed to the sale of 
machinery. At the same time the publishing divisions came out of recession and went on to 
produce significant, and profitable, increases in revenue. By the time of its closure in 1989, 
the Printing division represented only 6 per cent of OUP’s group turnover. Over a period of 
nearly thirty years, its workforce shrank whilst the publishing divisions increased their head 
count. There were attempts before the closure in 1989 to revitalize the mix of work in the 
printing division, improve procedures, and promote efficiency. From 1985 to 1986 the 
management negotiated a new incentive scheme, the Saleable Output Scheme. Anyone 
reading Mick Belson’s book, On the Press, will have been both amazed and bemused by the 
intricacies of the previous scheme, which worked on an individual basis and was ‘paid for at 
time saved against a standard’. The new scheme, designed to encourage teamwork, was 
based around group performance, and required considerable negotiation. Each section had 
to agree to the new scheme and this took some time to agree with the involvement of the 
unions. Internal documents show considerable unease in the Printing Division about the 
management of the factory and the systems in place for giving estimates to potential 
customers, communication with customers, speed of invoicing, financial control, and 
general administration. These echo issues expressed by the publishing divisions in the early 
1980s about the level of service offered. Prices continued to be offered at rates well above 
the competition, and as the typesetting capacity had shrunk, the speed of service was well 
behind external suppliers. Typically it would take only a month to obtain proofs from an 
external typesetter whereas, as Barry Townsend remembers, ‘if you sent a monograph to 
the printing division, you might start seeing proofs in about three months, if you were 
lucky.’37 
 
Further retrenchment took place after 1983 with more losses of staff. In an attempt to 
present a more independent image to outside customers, the division was renamed the 
Printing House. Two web presses were sold in 1987 as the Printing House effectively 
withdrew from long-run printing, which was work actively pursued by other printers, at 
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keen prices, in order to keep their presses running. At the same time new investment was 
announced of £1.8m over two years, to buy new typesetting, printing and binding 
equipment with the aim of printing a mix of hardback, paperback, journals and examination 
papers. <Image 7.08>  The investment ended a period of considerable uncertainty, as 
reflected in this anonymous handwritten note to the Secretary in January 1987: ‘many 
composing employees at OUP have had a miserable Christmas because of the rumours that 
the closure of the origination areas is certain. Many children and homes depend on 
retaining their jobs. What is going on? Please issue a statement.’38  
  
The report recommending the injection of funds, presented to Finance Committee in 
January 1987, declared the option ‘commercially unattractive. However, for reasons of 
history, sentiment, and social responsibility which prevent us from considering complete 
closure [this] is recommended as the best plan to pursue.’39 Regarding the injection of 
capital, George Richardson said: ‘I saw the writing on the wall, but that doesn’t mean you 
shut the shop.’40 In the light of the closure in only two years from then, the investment can 
be seen as a questionable decision, but it did offer the benefit of making the works more 
attractive to a potential buyer, if one could be found. Discussions were in hand with Robert 
Gavron, chairman of the St Ives Group, at the beginning of 1987, about the future shape and 
scope of the Printing House.41 
  
The report of 1987 had been commissioned in response to the loss of the contract in 1986 
to supply examination papers to the West African Examination Council (WAEC). This was a 
significant blow to the business of the Printing House. Confidential printing had a long 
history and gained fresh importance during the Second World War.42 The printing of 
examination papers required a high level of secrecy and the printing division maintained a 
market lead. Examination of the print jobs invoiced in October and November 1982 shows 
that the printing division lost money on a range of work for the publishing divisions, 
including the Oxford Mini Dictionary and the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of 
Current English. Jobs carried out for outside publishers included the Masonic Year Book and, 
for Fontana, Two Tales of Basil Brush; extraordinarily these titles all recorded a loss.  That 
such work was undertaken, in effect to keep the presses rolling, suggests a level of 
desperation. On work for University departments, such as the examination decrees, a small 
surplus was recorded. Work on examination papers, in comparison, made significant profits.  
<Image 7.09> 
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Cyril Cox, Head of the Reading Department, recalls seeing ominous clouds building up two 
years before the closure of the Printing House. The first inkling we got in the proofreading 
and copy-editing area was the obvious one that the work started to dry up because the 
typesetting was being sent mainly to India and all points east - hence we didn’t get the 
proofs. At that time I had something like twenty proof-readers and copy-editors in the 
department, 50 per cent of whom were sitting around, eventually doing nothing, literally 
reading the paper.’43 By December 1988 the financial position of the Printing House looked 
bleak, and no buyer had been found. Print sales were well down on the previous year and it 
was a thin year for examination papers, with sales again well down. In the area of 
composition, Stanford pointed out that composition could be bought much more cheaply 
from small suppliers outside the Press. He proposed a range of measures, including 
withdrawal from 40,000 square foot of space (the publishing divisions were looking for extra 
office space), disposal of the remaining web capacity, a further concentration on a smaller 
range of products, closure of the majority of composition, and a further reduction in the 
workforce by 45 to 201 employees.44 
 
Stanford’s proposal was submitted to a special meeting of the Finance Committee on 
Monday 30 January 1989. The Secretary was now Roger Elliott, who had formerly been its 
chairman and had been closely involved in the discussions about printing over a long 
period.45 Indeed a special white telephone had been installed in George Richardson’s office 
to facilitate their private discussions without the need to go through secretaries or 
switchboards.46 In a separate paper for the January meeting, Elliott recommended that ‘the 
Printing House should be closed forthwith. It is no longer a central requirement for the 
continued prosperity of the Press. Its current rate of loss, estimated at £1.6m on a turnover 
of £6m, cannot be tolerated and is an unjustified drain on the resources of the whole 
operation.’47 The decision to close the Printing House was carried with only the Printer 
dissenting. The meeting stressed the importance of continuing some printing, both for 
historical reasons and to serve the needs of the University. Authority was given to negotiate 
redundancy on generous terms. 
  
In the end the Printing House was defeated by a combination of factors, from technological 
to economic, and its management did not respond quickly enough to change. The printing 
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companies which survived the 1980s had to develop an effective strategy, update working 
practices, and raise levels of productivity to compete effectively on price and service. The 
Printing House could offer a Rolls Royce service but this was no longer required for the 
majority of print jobs, and given the diversity of OUP’s publishing, it could not carry all the 
equipment necessary to match those operations. In truth the Press did not need its own 
printing operation on any significant scale given the range of cheaper options available; and 
hot metal typesetting had been overtaken by computerization. There are many stories 
about the talents of the staff, for example the reader who knew 26 languages or the 
compositor who didn’t know Urdu but realized there was a mistake in the copy for a book 
when he had to make an unusual hand movement to set a page using metal type.48 Yet most 
books did not require highly skilled craftsmen or knowledge of a range of languages. Despite 
the reduction in its size over a number of years, the Printing House could not find a 
profitable niche in a changed world.  <Image 7.10> 
 
By 1989 the political climate had changed also. There had been a run-in with the unions 
over the closure of the Neasden distribution centre but by the late 1980s the situation was 
different. Elliott recalls how ‘the battle of Wapping had changed the power of the print 
unions significantly so that it was much more politically acceptable to close inefficient 
industries, or industries that were not operating in profit - and in particular the print unions 
had lost some of their teeth.’49 He regarded the closure as ‘clearly the right thing to do: it 
stopped the printing losses, it stopped all the amount of management time and the 
arguments between publishers and printers, and freed up the site ... to house all the 
publishing staff ... it was win all round’.  
  
The closure of the Printing House was officially announced on Wednesday 1 February 1989.  
The decision was announced to staff by the Secretary and the Printer. The Finance Director, 
Bill Andrewes, who was standing with them on a box on the floor of the works when the 
news was given, said ‘you could have heard a pin drop’.50 Mick Belson also remembers that 
day: ‘Was the end of printing at Oxford brought about by management ineptitude or by a 
well-executed plan by the Publishing Division? I don’t know and I don’t really care. I just 
know that something very special and precious was lost at 2 p.m. on Wednesday, 1 February 
1989 when I and all the other Clickers [foremen] at the Press shepherded their charges into 
the Lithographic Department to be faced by a grimfaced Printer and Sir Roger Elliott ... 
Standing on a pile of wooden pallets they simply announced the closure of the finest 
printing house in the world. The stunned silence could be felt. ... There were no tears or the 
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wailing and gnashing of teeth. Everyone filed out quietly with dignity.’51 There was 
astonishment amongst staff in both the printing and publishing parts of the business – after 
all, had not there been significant new investment granted only two years before? 
Interviewed in the Oxford Mail, Herby Gibbons, who had worked at OUP for 34 years, said: 
‘We were expecting something, but news of a complete shutdown came as devastation. 
After the meeting there was hardly anything said – people just walked away in disbelief. We 
have had a big investment of more than £1m during the past two years within OUP printing, 
and we thought our future was virtually safe, but it turns out it was not.’52  
  
For many printing staff, their work was more than just a job – it was a way of life as part of a 
close-knit family. The general feeling was that the Publishing side of OUP had let them down 
and a level of bitterness about the closure exists to this day amongst the former employees 
of the Printing House. In Mick Belson’s final chapter, ‘Beginning of the End with Sweet 
Memories’, he lists a catalogue of hurts felt over the years by the printers, including the 
closure of the bar and sporting facilities at the Clarendon Press Institute; the award of the 
typesetting work for the OED in 1979 to one of the Printing Division’s rivals, and the printing 
of the dictionary in the USA; and the closure of the Clarendonian, the printers’ in-house 
magazine in 1983. There is some irony in the fact that when there was a mistake in the 
production of the slip cases for the Compact OED in 1979 it was the Printing division which 
worked through the weekend to mend the damaged cases and appease the wrath of an 
important book club customer.53 Belson also points to the slow reduction of the workforce 
since 1970 and the gradual encroachment of the publishers into their territory. ‘Although 
the printers had no concrete evidence it was “common knowledge” that one day the 
publishers would oust them from their home.’54 Did there also exist a ‘them and us’ 
attitude? Some printers felt this to be true. Leofranc Holford-Strevens, a graduate reader 
who ‘escaped’ to the Academic Division in 1984, recalls visiting the publishing side of the 
Press. ‘How did I dare? How could I venture? It was almost as if I had to take tea with the 
Queen.’55 
  
The reaction in the wider world was of some shock and definite sadness at the passing of an 
era, and the closure attracted considerable correspondence in The Times.  <Image 7.11>  
The Egyptologist Harry James, formerly of the British Museum, wrote: ‘may I, as one of a 
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host of scholars who have benefited from the superlative quality of Oxford printing, say a 
few words in a sorrow that is but a poor reaction to what the Delegates have accomplished 
by a single act of vandalism? ... for generations of scholars OUP has meant volumes printed 
at Oxford, not necessarily published at Oxford.’56 Locally, in Oxfordshire, Elizabeth Brunner, 
mother of Hugo Brunner, a publisher who had himself worked for OUP, wrote that ‘were the 
Press a stately home or part of the coastline it might be saved by the National Trust. But it is 
a live, human part of our heritage, a place where a great craft is handed on decade by 
decade, and has no similar protective body to turn to in such a situation.’57 The Archbishop 
of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, wrote to the staff of the Printing House to express his 
sadness. ‘I know how great has been the dedication, skill, even devotion, which working in 
the printing house has inspired. And I know too how much many of you will miss being part 
of such a close and cooperative community.’58 Roger Woddis contributed a poem to The 
Listener, which included the lines:59 
Another chapter closes, 
The trend is not unique 
Only a fool composes 
In Ancient Greek 
 
Negotiations with the unions began and went through reasonably smoothly, given the 
generous redundancy terms. There was no real attempt by the unions to stop the closure, 
with more attention addressed to the terms being offered. Around 25 staff were redeployed 
to Oxuniprint, the in-house print unit for OUP and the University. The total cost of 
redundancy exceeded £3m but much of this was recouped when equipment from the 
Printing House was sold off as one job lot for £2m to Robert Maxwell’s BPCC (British Printing 
and Communication Corporation). The Oxford Mail reported on the first casualty of the 
closure. A yucca plant, named ‘Bill Tin’ after the bonus scheme, was carried out of the front 
gate to be handed over to the Kilner Ward at the Radcliffe Infirmary. The name was 
explained by one worker, who said that whenever they asked for more money in their 
bonus, they were told it was ‘built in’.60 A new university crest was circulated with the 
inscription, Deus Delegatos Deleat.  Genevieve Hawkins, editor of the University Gazette 
and originally a reader in the Printing Division, who wrote in the Oxford Magazine in 1989: ‘I 
think of Sussex after the tempest of 1987: the great trees, that deserved a better end, lying 
on their sides with their roots in the air; but also, a landscape changed, that will never be 
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the same again: a barren slope where once there was a wood.’61  Such elegiac sentiments 
are understandable, though something more than a barren slope survived.62 A harsher 
verdict would be that the Press made a substantial investment at a point when it was not 
going to provide a solution.63  There was a fundamental problem which had to be 
recognized. Sir Gordon Brunton, an external member of the Finance Committee, a man with 
a great deal of pertinent experience, argued that it was impossible to make a success of a 
combined publishing and printing business as the printer was featherbedded by the 
knowledge that work from his publisher would always be forthcoming, while other 
publishers would be reluctant to give him work because they believed that the home 
publisher’s work would always be given priority.64 There was no way round that reality. 
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